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Should Business be Moral? 
THOMAS DONALDSON*
Remarks on Hans-Ulrich Küpper’s article 
Professor Küpper argues cogently for an alternative conception of business ethics. 
The starting point, he asserts, should not be normative claims, i.e., claims about what 
business “ought” or “ought not” do, but the analysis of the real moral problems con-
fronting business. As researchers, we should dig into the real-world problems that 
confront accounting, finance, and marketing, and we should eschew subjective values 
in favor of more scientific and empirical modes of analysis. This approach, he con-
cludes, opens new perspectives and allows for the use of logical, empirical methods 
and the kind of knowledge that is “familiar to business administration academics.” 
Earlier normative attempts by German theorists such as Homann, Steinmann, and 
Ulrich, he notes, have failed to gain currency. In turn, a shift in approach away from 
the normative and towards the analytical and empirical is important for making busi-
ness ethics more popular in German-speaking countries. 
Along the way, Professor Küpper provides a rich account of the historical roots of the 
intellectual obstacles that until the 1980s blocked serious work in business ethics. 
But why have the several normative positions and concepts of business ethics failed to 
gain acceptance in German-speaking countries? Is it because, as Küpper argues, they 
have been excessively normative? Or is it, rather, because they have been excessively 
abstract and unconnected to concrete business issues? Or is it possibly even because 
they are ahead of their time, unrecognized by nearsighted academics and business 
practitioners caught up in their own fraying paradigms? 
I agree with Professor Küpper that business ethics in German-speaking countries 
should become more connected to day-to-day business problems. But I disagree that 
the solution is to emphasize the empirical and the analytical aspects of research at the 
expense of the normative. The solution is not to ban the normative, but to “triangu-
late” research between normative and empirical positions in the context of practical 
business problems. To abandon the normative to the realm of the subjective and mere 
personal taste is to give the game up to the ideological extremists who sometimes 
claim to speak for market-based economics. These extremists have their own norma-
tive assumption in full view. To abandon the normative to the realm of taste amounts 
to a failure to answer the most pressing question in all of business ethics, namely, 
“Should business be moral?”  
________________________ 
*  Thomas Donaldson, Mark O. Winkelman Professor, Wharton School, University of Pennsyl-
vania, 3730 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6340, USA, phone: +1-(0)215-898-6859, fax: 
+1(0)-610-520-4401, email donaldst@wharton.upenn.edu, fields of expertise: business ethics; 
corporate social responsibility; ethical theory; ethics and economics. 
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I wish to interpret professor Küpper’s good article fairly. He does not argue simplisti-
cally that we should banish normative analysis. His more nuanced approach advises us 
to be more “scientific” in approaching normative issues. He notes insightfully how 
even decision theory debates norms of rationality, and how science itself requires 
normative principles for its pursuit. There is much to admire and to learn from his 
account. And, yet, as he responds to critics of business ethics such as Friedrich August 
von Hayek and Milton Friedman, he is moved to recommend significant constraints 
on normative theorizing. The science of ethics is not about recommending norms, 
principles, and rules, he argues, but only about analyzing and discussing them.  
He advances the intriguing notion of “analytical business ethics,” a concept with three 
intersubjectively verifiable parts: (1) logical, (2) empirical, and (3) normative. But while 
this tripartite classification may seem to condone robust normative theorizing, Küpper 
is quick to add that normative statements can “be neither logically nor empirically 
true.” Their validity depends on values and judgments, and “values can only be ac-
cepted personally.” Science must “respect everybody’s freedom to accept fundamental 
principles and moral values for themselves.” In turn, the analytical approach to busi-
ness ethics he recommends addresses moral problems using only empirical research, 
logical deductions, and the analysis of reasons to justify evaluations. 
In critiquing Küpper’s position, I will leave aside the venerable current of philosophi-
cal ethics, embodied most brilliantly in the work of the German philosopher, Imman-
uel Kant (1785), which flatly denies that all normative statements either lack logical 
justification or are doomed to mere tautologies. Instead, I wish to focus on the futility 
of an overly narrow conception of normative theorizing, and to show why avoiding 
straightforward normative theorizing sacrifices our ability to condemn bad business 
behavior of the kind that brings scandals at Enron, Parmalat, Volkswagen, and Sie-
mens into popular relief. 
If we look closely at Küpper’s remarks we find, ironically, that they are laced with 
normative claims of the kind he wants researchers to avoid. This reveals a subtle con-
tradiction. For example, he asserts on the one hand that normative statements can 
only be accepted personally, even as he claims on the other hand that “science must 
respect everybody's freedom to accept fundamental principles and moral values for 
themselves.” The epistemological status of the second claim, i.e., the proposition that 
science must respect personal freedom, is surely more than the expression of personal
taste. It is a proposition meant to be accepted, and accepted even by those whose 
personal tastes might be to deny it. 
Similarly, when discussing the freedom to adopt personal moral precepts, Küpper 
observes that ethical freedom is characteristic of modern, free societies and that within 
the boundaries of human rights each person “should be free to choose his/her own 
basic values.” Hence, he observes, correctly, how a perfect framework of moral rules 
and incentives is not even desirable. Küpper’s point reflects what I have elsewhere 
called “moral free space.” (Donaldson/Dunfee 1999) An oppressive morality that fails 
to allow different moral interpretations of morality in economic life is in itself im-
moral. But some limits must nonetheless exist on moral free space, and Küpper ac-
knowledges as much when he notes that even freedom must operate within the 
boundaries of “human rights.” The obvious question, then, is what gives Küpper or 
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anyone else a scientific basis to make the robust normative claim that business behav-
ior “must respect human rights?” 
His analysis of the methods for solving conflicts between economic goals and ethical 
criteria (in which he offers a two-by-two matrix of possibilities) similarly entails sig-
nificant normative claims. For example, the matrix suggests that firms exposed to the 
IV quadrant, i.e., of negative compatibility, will “try to avoid” the conflict. But pre-
cisely why should firms avoid the conflict? What if embracing the conflict happens to 
make them more money? The unspoken reason, of course, is that at least ceteris paribus
firms should avoid immoral behavior.  
Presumably Küpper’s analytical business ethicist is precluded from ever objectively 
justifying a normative view about whether all corporations should single-mindedly 
pursue the maximization of shareholder interests. This goes too far. The question of 
whether pure shareholder interest maximization is morally justified, indeed, is the sine
qua non of business ethics. It boils down to the basic question of why and whether a 
business should even be concerned about morality. Without answering it objectively, 
we have no intellectual footing to proceed with the analysis of any specific ethical 
problem, be it in accounting, marketing, finance, strategy, or elsewhere. Without an-
swering it objectively, we are left to the simplistic moral logic of profit maximization. 
Critics of business ethics, notably, have no qualms about introducing normative claims 
in their analysis. For example, Milton Friedman acknowledges that the pursuit of prof-
its does not excuse a manager who engages in fraud or deception and, even more, that 
corporations themselves are obliged to conform to the morality of the surrounding 
society. He and other conservative economists also display moral concern frequently; 
for example, when they observe managers abusing their responsibility by gathering 
lavish perks and compensation. They are insistent on the moral, fiduciary duties of 
managers to shareowners. Violating those duties, for such theorists, is more than a 
legal violation: it is a violation of the moral duty they have to the owners of the prop-
erty they have pledged to manage.  
Hence, in order to find better conceptual tools with which to address practical busi-
ness problems, we must at a minimum identify the normative role and function of the 
modern corporation. Such approaches remain in their infancy at this stage of history, 
but desperately need further development. Two requirements exist for any such the-
ory:
(1) the theory must embody normative and not merely descriptive principles, and 
(2) the theory must be capable as dealing with the corporation qua corporation. 
In other words, it must first embody principles that do more than merely describe and 
explain the facts of corporations but that paint a picture of the role that corporations 
should play in society. Second, it must analyze the corporation on its own terms and as 
more than a second-order phenomenon of economics or political behavior. 
Empirical data gathering and philosophical theorizing lie at the extreme ends of a 
spectrum of research activities, each of which has something important to contribute 
to our understanding of ethics/business and society. It is tempting to suppose that 
only empirical claims can rest on solid theoretical foundations, and that normative 
ones must be left to emotion or personal preference. When put in its starkest form by 
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a small group of philosophers of science in the early and mid-twentieth century (Pop-
per 1959), this view produced the infamous “falsifiability” criterion: to wit, 
The only propositions which can be said to be true are those subject to falsifica-
tion through observation or experiment. 
Philosophers of science, however, rightly abandoned this doctrine later in the twenti-
eth century once they noticed that the falsifiability proposition itself could never be 
falsified through observation and experiment.  
Küpper is surely correct to insist that empirical research should be more prominent in 
business ethics. And he is correct also to identify the epistemologically distinct, almost 
irreconcilable difference between empirical and normative methodology. But this dif-
ference does not preclude what might be called “normative triangulation.” Normative 
triangulation involves discovering a relevant factor by triangulating between a norma-
tive precept and another factor. Anyone who has studied trigonometry knows that it is 
possible to calculate the distance to the far vertex of a triangle by knowing only the 
length of the side and the angles of the two remaining sides. We can know how far 
offshore a ship is, or how far the moon is from the earth, without ever measuring the 
distance directly. All we need to know are the angles of the views from the observa-
tion points to the distant object, and the distance between our two points. 
Adam Smith (1776) triangulated between the normative precept of the wealth of na-
tions and the inevitable, if regrettable self interested motivation of individuals. His 
brilliant discovery, memorialized in the Wealth of Nations, was made possible not only 
because of his knowledge of the empirical springs of human behavior, but because of 
his formidable knowledge of moral theory. Smith’s particular genius lay in measuring 
the distance between what people ought to do and what they actually do. It was a kind 
of triangulation between two worlds: the world that ought to be, and the world that is. 
He knew well that prevailing norms of Christianity and moral theory encouraged peo-
ple away from selfishness and towards charity and benevolence. In fact, he himself 
believed that these two motives were mankind’s noblest. But he also understood that 
by discouraging selfish ambition, contemporary attitudes discouraged the initiative and 
industriousness needed to generate a material surplus for society. If he could demon-
strate that self-interested behavior possessed a moral rationale, not so much for the 
individual, but for the society as a whole, then his ideas could enhance the wealth of 
nations and, in turn, benefit everyone, even those who were least-well off. “It is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner,” Smith famously wrote, “but from their regard of their own interest.” In a 
single stroke, Smith thus broke demolished Mercantilism’s stranglehold on thought, 
and ushered in a new, more prosperous economic order. 
Some of the most important work in economics and philosophy that has emerged 
over the past three decades is rigorous, logical, and theoretically elegant, but only indi-
rectly dependent on observation or experiment. It has involved precisely the kind of 
“normative triangulation” described above. This includes much of Amartya Sen’s 
path-breaking analysis of the ethical foundations of economic theory (Sen 1985; 1987; 
1992; 1993; 1994), and the political/economic philosophy of John Rawls (Rawls 1971; 
1993; Rawls/McMurrin 1987). 
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The time for such hybrid, normative analysis is ripe. At no time has the appetite for 
knowledge about ethics/business and society been so large. And at no time has the 
legitimacy of business depended so heavily on clarifying its connection to human val-
ues.
Hence, as we define what is possible for good management research today, we should 
avoid framing our answers in the Procrustean either-or bed of data vs. theory, facts vs. 
emotion, or normative versus empirical propositions. Some of the most popular con-
temporary frameworks used for analyzing ethical issues in business, such as social 
contract theory, stakeholder theory, and experimental economics/game theory, are 
clearly methodological hybrids. Not empiricism only then, but empiricism plus norma-
tive tools, appears to be the winning methodological formula for research in eth-
ics/business and society, whether in German-speaking countries or elsewhere.1
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